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The benefits of specific risk-factor disclosures 
 
Abstract 
Practitioners have long criticized risk-factor disclosures in the 10-K as generic and boilerplate. In 
response, regulators emphasize the importance of being specific. By using a computing algorithm, 
this paper establishes a new measure (Specificity) to quantify the level of specificity of firms’ 
qualitative risk-factor disclosures. We first examine determinants of variations in Specificity, and 
document that firms with high proprietary costs provide less specific risk-factor disclosures. More 
importantly, we find that, controlling for numerous determinants, the market reaction to the 10-K 
filing is positively and significantly associated with Specificity. In addition, our results suggest that 
analysts are better able to assess fundamental risk when firms’ risk-factor disclosures are more 
specific. Together, these findings suggest that more specific risk-factor disclosures benefit users of 
financial statements. 
 
Key words: Risk-Factor disclosure, Specificity, Specificity, Market reactions, Trading volume, 
Analyst risk assessments, Scenario analysis 
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The benefits of specific risk-factor disclosures 
1. Introduction 
This paper provides unique evidence on the benefits of more specific risk-factor 
disclosures. While extensive prior research has examined how capital markets react to earnings 
information to form expectations about stock returns (see Kothari 2001 for an overview of such 
research), less is known about how investors incorporate risk information. The market-wide 
underestimation of risk reflected in the 2007–2009 financial crisis has increased the demand for 
improved risk reporting (Singleton-Green and Hodgkinson 2011). Risk-factor disclosure (Item 1A 
in the 10-K report), which has been criticized by practitioners as boilerplate, has received 
considerable attention from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during and after the 
financial crisis. Many SEC comment letters are issued to those firms whose risk-factor disclosures 
are deemed to be generic (Johnson 2010). Despite the SEC’s call for more specific risk disclosure, 
there is limited evidence concerning the benefits of such practice. 
In this paper, by introducing a computing algorithm to quantify the level of specificity of 
firms’ qualitative risk-factor disclosures on a large-scale sample, we speak to the issue of whether 
being more specific is a desirable feature of qualitative disclosure.1 That is, we investigate whether 
and how investors and analysts benefit from more specific risk-factor disclosure. To address this 
research question, we first explore potential determinants of the degree of specificity in risk-factor 
disclosures. Then, after controlling for determinants, we examine whether specificity is positively 
associated with (1) the stock-market reactions to risk-factor disclosures and (2) analysts’ reliability 
in assessing fundamental risk. 
                                                 
1 By “specificity” we mean that a higher level of detail is provided conditional on the firm deciding to disclose a 
particular risk. In other words, given the disclosed risk factors (we control for the proxies for content used in extant 
research), the construct we are interested in captures the variation in the specificity of the disclosure. 
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Risk disclosure is potentially valuable when investors are uncertain of the riskiness of the 
firm’s cash flows, which is a reasonable assumption based on prior research (e.g., Beyer 2009; 
Heinle and Smith 2015). Our study is motivated in part by Heinle and Smith (2015), who provide 
a model of imperfect risk disclosures. They investigate how stock prices react to noisy signals of 
the variance of cash flows, and conclude that more precise signals receive greater weights. Our 
study provides empirical evidence consistent with their theoretical predictions. 
To examine the economic consequences of providing more specific risk-factor disclosures, 
we introduce a new measure, Specificity, to quantify the specificity in firms’ risk-factor disclosures. 
Specific entity names such as “Microsoft” or “China” contain more specific information than 
general words such as “supplier” or “geographic segment.” For example, “Our China business 
heavily relies on Microsoft for supply” represents greater specificity of the disclosing firm than 
“One of our geographic segments relies heavily on one supplier.” Consistent with this concept, we 
construct Specificity as the number of specific entity names, including names of persons, locations, 
and organizations; quantitative values in percentages; money values in dollars; times; and dates, 
all scaled by the total number of words in that section.2 To extract specific entity names, we use 
the Named Entity Recognition (NER) technique and specifically the Stanford NER tool, which 
can extract entity names close to human performance (Finkel, Grenager, and Manning 2005). The 
higher the value of Specificity, the more specific the risk-factor disclosures are. 
As Specificity is new to the literature, we perform validity tests by asking both senior 
undergraduate accounting students and Ph.D. students in accounting to manually score a random 
sample of risk-factor disclosures. We compare our NER-based measure with the students’ scores 
and find a high correlation (see Section 3.1 for details), suggesting that our measure has external 
                                                 
2 Inferences are unaffected if we do not scale by the total number of words. 
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validity. 
In our empirical analyses, we first explore the determinants of Specificity. Consistent with 
the emphasis on competitive concerns by practitioners and academics, we find that firms with high 
proprietary costs provide less specific risk-factor disclosures. Furthermore, we show that 
Specificity is positively related to the number of risk-related words from Campbell, Chen, 
Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), the 10-K report length, and proxies for firm risk, and negatively 
associated with total accruals and firm size. 
Our primary interest lies in the economic consequences of firms’ more specific risk 
disclosure. For this purpose we conduct short-window market-reaction tests. An established 
strength of event-study methodology is that it reduces the chances of other variables explaining 
the documented effects. Nevertheless, our multivariate tests contain numerous controls motivated 
by prior research. Specifically, we control both for factors prior research has shown to affect market 
reactions and for all determinants of variations in Specificity. We find a strong positive relation 
between Specificity and the absolute value of three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the 
10-K filing date, suggesting that a higher level of specificity leads to a stronger market reaction. 
In additional analyses, we consider abnormal short-window trading volume as an alternative 
measure of stock-market reaction. We find a positive and significant trading-volume reaction, 
further corroborating our findings based on stock-price reactions.  
To provide further comfort in our primary findings, we implement a pseudo analysis. 
Specifically, in the years from 2001 to 2004 (a period when risk-factor disclosures were not 
required by the SEC), we repeat the market-reaction tests using Specificity calculated based on 
risk-factor disclosures from 10-K reports filed in 2006 as a pseudo Specificity measure. In these 
pseudo tests we find no evidence of Specificity being significant, reducing possible concerns that 
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Specificity may capture omitted firm and firm-report characteristics. Given the importance of 
proprietary costs as a deterrent to voluntary disclosure in general and to providing specific risk-
factor disclosures in particular, we additionally partition our sample and find that both the 
abnormal returns and abnormal volume results are only present in low proprietary costs 
subsamples. 
Next, we also find that a higher Specificity enhances the reliability of analysts’ fundamental 
risk analysis. Specifically, we study the scenario analyses provided by sell-side analysts at Morgan 
Stanley. Morgan Stanley has required equity analysts to use a “risk-reward framework” since 2007. 
In addition to providing a traditional base-case valuation, which is derived from a fundamentals-
based analysis of the company’s intrinsic value and its projected cash flows in the following 12 
months, analysts are required to expand their analyses to present both the bull and the bear case-
valuation scenarios. Joos, Piotroski, and Srinivasan (2015) document a significant positive relation 
between the spread between the bull and bear valuations and the absolute value of future 12-month 
unanticipated stock returns. In other words, the analyst’s ex-ante expected range of future price 
movements is significantly and positively associated with the extent to which the realized price 
after 12 months differs from the analyst’s base case valuation. They regard this positive relation as 
evidence that analysts reliably assess fundamental risk, because it suggests that through the ex-
ante price spread analysts provide a reliable picture of future price movements.  
We hand collect analysts’ reports from Thomson Investext and manually extract the 
information on risk-reward analyses. We first replicate the Joos et al. (2015) results in our sample. 
We then show that analysts only reliably assess fundamental risk for the subsample of firms whose 
risk-factor disclosure exhibits higher Specificity. This finding suggests that analysts better assess 
firms’ fundamental risk when risk-factor disclosures are more specific.  
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This paper makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the textual-analysis literature 
by introducing a new measure to quantify the level of specificity of qualitative disclosure. Prior 
work studying management forecasts codes pure qualitative information as the least specific; open-
ended and range information as better; and point value as the best (e.g., Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 
2008). However, within the category of qualitative disclosure, to date there have been few attempts 
to quantify and calibrate specificity levels. The Specificity measure we develop enables researchers 
to differentiate the specificity level among qualitative disclosures and captures another quality 
aspect besides the readability measures used in prior literature (e.g., Li 2008; De Franco, Hope, 
Vyas, and Zhou 2015).  
Second, our study complements the extant risk-disclosure literature, particularly the 
literature on qualitative risk disclosure. Prior work studies quantitative risk information such as 
VaR disclosure within the banking industry (Jorion 2002; Perignon, Deng, and Wang 2008) as well 
as quantitative market-risk disclosures (Rajgopal 1999; Thornton and Welker 2004; Linsmeier, 
Thornton, Venkatachalam, and Welker 2002). However, qualitative risk disclosure has not been 
studied until recently, with the advance of textual-analysis techniques. Campbell et al. (2014) 
quantify the amount of risk disclosed from a firm’s risk-factor disclosure by counting the number 
of risk-related words contained in their predefined dictionary. Similarly, Kravet and Muslu (2013) 
use the number of sentences containing predefined uncertainty words. While these papers study 
the amount of risk-related information in qualitative risk-factor disclosures, our study differs from 
theirs in that it focuses on the quality (or specificity) of risk disclosure. Schrand and Elliott (1998) 
highlight that it is hard to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of risk disclosure because there 
is no ex-post settling up. A greater specificity, however, makes the disclosed information more 
accurate and more verifiable ex post. Thus, by proposing Specificity as a quality measure, our paper 
6 
 
addresses the challenges in assessing risk-disclosure quality. 
Third, this is the first study to demonstrate how analysts’ risk assessment is affected by 
firms’ risk-disclosure practices. While extensive research has examined analysts’ behaviors in 
forecasting earnings and recommending stocks (see Bradshaw 2015 for an overview of such 
research), research on analysts’ behavior in assessing fundamental risk is scarce, with only a few 
exceptions. Lui, Markov, and Tamayo (2007, 2012) document the firm characteristics that 
contribute to sell-side analysts’ risk ratings and the price impact of analysts’ risk-ratings changes 
on the stock market. Joos et al. (2015) examine the reliability of sell-side analysts’ risk assessment 
by evaluating the scenario analyses provided by Morgan Stanley analysts. None of these studies, 
however, investigates the relation between firms’ risk-disclosure practices and analysts’ risk 
assessment. 
Finally, from a policy perspective, this paper provides empirical evidence supporting the 
SEC’s call for more specific risk disclosures. The findings suggest that improved corporate risk 
reporting—especially more specific risk-factor disclosures—benefits investors, and that risk-
factor disclosures are likely not “just boilerplate” (as some suggest). We also find that investors 
seem to appreciate quantitative disclosures more than qualitative ones, and this suggests that 
regulators could improve the information content of risk disclosures by asking for more 
quantitative disclosures. 
The next section provides background and develops our hypotheses. In Section 3 we 
describe Specificity and explain the empirical design. Data collection and summary statistics are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results. We conclude the paper in Section 
6. 
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2. Background, literature review, and hypotheses development 
2.1 Institutional background and literature review 
In 2005 the SEC required firms to extend their risk-factor disclosures to their quarterly and 
annual reports to describe “the most significant factors that make the company speculative or 
risky.” Previously, such disclosure was only required in S-1 registration statements, which are filed 
before a firm proceeds with a public offering. Although this risk-factor section (Item 1A in the 10-
K report) is mandatory, firms still have a great degree of discretion, because only qualitative 
description is required. This contributes to practitioners’ criticism that risk-factor disclosure is 
useless as it contains only boilerplate information. After the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the SEC 
re-emphasized its initial requirement that firms should “avoid generic risk-factor disclosures that 
can be applied to any firms” (Johnson 2010). For example, the SEC questioned a risk factor in 
Eagle Materials’ 10-K for fiscal year 2009. The reviewer, an SEC accounting branch chief named 
Rufus Decker, said the building-materials provider’s brief note about the possibility of economic 
and market conditions affecting the fair value of its pension assets was “too broad and generic.” 
Decker further wrote: “It is not readily apparent why such risk would be unique to you and your 
business” (Johnson 2010).  
The first explicit risk-disclosure section in the 10-K was required by the SEC in 1997 with 
the release of FRR No. 48, which requires firms to include a discussion of “Qualitative and 
Quantitative Market Risks” (Item 7A) in annual and quarterly reports.3,4 Previous studies support 
                                                 
3 For completeness, accounting academics had sought risk-related information in financial reports even before explicit 
risk disclosure was required by regulatory authorities. For example, Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) were the first 
to study the relation between beta and financial-statement risk measures. They document that market-based beta is 
positively correlated with a firm’s leverage and earnings variability and negatively correlated with a firm’s dividend 
payout ratio (see also Hamada 1972; Lev 1974). 
4 The MD&A also includes discussion about risks but is not explicitly focused on risk. Other accounting rules related 
to risk disclosures include SFAS No. 140, which requires firms with securitized financial assets to disclose information 
about key assumptions made in determining fair values of retained interests, and SFAS No. 133, which encourages 
firms to disclose quantitative information about market risks of derivative instruments and hedging activities. 
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the efficacy of FRR No. 48 by showing that the disclosed exposures to certain risk factors, such as 
commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, and interest rates, have incremental power to explain 
the future stock-return sensitivity to the risk-factors (Rajgopal 1999; Thornton and Welker 2004; 
Linsmeier et al. 2002). However, these studies examined only market-risk disclosure and its 
information content.5 In addition, Sribunnak and Wong (2006) show that the allowed exclusion of 
nonfinancial positions from the market-risk disclosure hinders the usefulness of the disclosed 
quantitative information. 
“Risk factors,” Item 1A of the 10-K required by the SEC in 2005, provides risk information 
in a broader sense not limited to firms’ market risk and financial positions; however, the 
information contained in this section is descriptive and qualitative. In an early study, Li (2006) 
counts the frequencies of the words “risk” (“risks” and “risky”) and “uncertain” (“uncertainty” and 
“uncertainties”) as proxies for risk sentiment in firms’ 10-K reports. The most closely related 
studies are two recent ones, by Kravet and Muslu (2013) and Campbell et al. (2014), that quantify 
the amount of risk disclosed in qualitative risk disclosure by establishing predefined dictionaries. 
The analyses in Kravet and Muslu (2013) and Campbell et al. (2014) show that firms with high 
leverage discuss more debt-risk factors; firms with low taxes discuss more tax-risk factors; firms 
with high pre-disclosure betas discuss more systematic risk factors; and firms with high pre-
disclosure stock-return volatility discuss more idiosyncratic risk factors. In terms of economic 
consequences of risk-factor disclosures, Campbell et al. (2014) find a significant positive relation 
between the number of risk-related words identified in the risk-factor section and future stock-
return volatility and market-based beta, after controlling for historical volatility and historical 
                                                 
5 To be precise, FRR 48 is about market risk (e.g., interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, and 
commodity price risk) inherent in market risk sensitive instruments. In contrast, Item 1A requires the discussion of 
“the most significant factors that make the company speculative or risky.” (Regulation SK, Item 305(c), SEC 2005). 
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market beta. Kravet and Muslu (2013) demonstrate that the year-to-year change in the number of 
sentences containing uncertainty words in a company’s 10-K file is positively associated with the 
future stock-return volatility and the three-day abnormal trading volume around the 10-K filing 
date. We complement these studies by providing further empirical evidence on risk-factor 
disclosures and in particular address the policy question of whether greater specificity in risk 
disclosures benefits investors. 
To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers study analysts’ behaviors in assessing 
firms’ risk. Lui, Markov, and Tamayo (2007) find that firm characteristics commonly viewed as 
risk proxies, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, leverage, and accounting losses, are positively related 
to sell-side analysts’ risk ratings, and that analysts’ risk ratings in turn are positively associated 
with future stock-return volatility. Lui et al. (2012) further show that changes in analysts’ risk 
ratings are followed by significant changes in Fama-French factor loadings, and that the stock-
price impact of risk-rating changes is greater than that of credit-rating changes. Finally, Joos et al. 
(2015) show that the bull-bear spread in Morgan Stanley analysts’ scenario analysis is positively 
associated with the base-case valuation error, indicating that analysts’ ex-ante forecasted price 
spread reliably pictures future price movement. 6  Based on this evidence, they conclude that 
analysts have some ability to assess fundamental risk. We add to this stream of literature by 
examining whether the specificity in disclosed risk factors is relevant for analysts in assessing risk. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses development  
 The hypotheses examined in this paper are centered on whether the extent to which 
                                                 
6 Dechow and You (2015) also provide evidence that is at least indirectly relevant. They predict and find that analysts’ 
target-price implied returns are a function of the expected dividend distribution, analysts’ private information, and 
errors with respect to forecasting cash flows and discount rates. 
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investors and analysts incorporate risk information varies with the level of specificity in risk 
disclosures. Our hypotheses are developed based on the assumptions that the market possesses a 
certain degree of efficiency and that analysts make the best use of public information given their 
time and attention constraints. 
Our primary premise is that more precise disclosures imply greater information content of 
the disclosures and that investors should thus pay more attention to such disclosures. Prior research 
concludes that information that is more costly to extract from financial reports is less completely 
incorporated in market prices (Ball 1992; Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2002: Bonsall, 
Bozanic, and Merkley 2015).7 Less precise information is likely more difficult for investors to 
extract, process, evaluate, and verify (Bozanic, Roulstone, and Van Buskirk 2015; Bonsall et al. 
2015). Importantly, Heinle and Smith (2015) present a model of the pricing effects of risk 
disclosures. Unlike prior analytical researchers, they assume that investors are uncertain about the 
variance of a firm’s cash flows, and that the firm releases an imperfect signal regarding this 
variance. Their primary findings are that this variance uncertainty is priced and that more precise 
signals receive greater weight. This is consistent with practitioners’ demand for more precise 
disclosures. The model offers a theoretical rationale for the prediction that the market should react 
more to more precise risk disclosure (i.e., we expect greater specificity to lead to more precise 
information).8 Intuitively, the idea is that a firm’s risk-factor disclosure should have a greater 
                                                 
7 Jørgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) analytically examine how risk disclosures can affect stock returns in a multi-
firm setting. 
8 In addition to these economics-based arguments, supporting arguments also exist in the psychology literature. In 
particular, according to Construal-Level Theory (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2010), concrete or specific information has 
greater impact on the judgments of events or objects that are psychologically close to the individuals, whereas abstract 
or general information has greater impact on the judgments of events or objects that are psychologically distant. To 
the extent that investors (analysts) and a particular firm they are investing in (covering) can be regarded as 
psychologically close, risk information that is more specific will have a greater impact on investors’ and analysts’ 
decisions. In other words, given a certain amount of risk disclosed, a higher level of specificity leads to a greater 
portion of risk information being processed, enhancing investors’ and analysts’ risk understanding. 
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impact on the investors’ decisions when it is higher in specificity. We thus predict that higher 
Specificity will lead investors to put more weight on the disclosed risk information, which will 
facilitate the incorporation of risk information into the stock price. This, in turn, will result in a 
stronger market reaction to the more specific risk-factor disclosures. However, the direction of 
stock-price change is unclear because how specific risk-factor disclosures affect investors’ 
perception of the mean of the variance of cash flows is uncertain (although greater specificity in 
risk-factor disclosure reduces the variance uncertainty premium and thus the expected cost of 
capital) (Heinle and Smith 2015). The above discussion leads to our first hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative form): 
 
H1: The stock-market reaction to the 10-K report is positively associated with the level of 
specificity in risk-factor disclosures. 
 
To the extent that more specific risk-factor disclosures have economic benefits, a natural 
question is why not all firms use specific language in their risk disclosures. The reason is that there 
are also costs to voluntary disclosure. In our empirical analyses, we first examine determinants of 
variations in Specificity. Perhaps most importantly, we consider the role of proprietary costs, the 
most commonly cited reason for lower-quality disclosure (see Verrecchia 2001 and Beyer et al. 
2010 for overviews of such arguments and related literature). Also important is that, for the tests 
of market reactions (in which we control for determinants), we examine whether investors’ 
responses vary systematically with the firm’s proprietary costs. 
Analysts’ risk assessment is economically important, as such assessment affects the risk 
perception of investors. We predict that, consistent with investors’, analysts’ judgments of the 
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covered firms should rely more on specific information than on general information. We thus 
hypothesize that more specific risk-factor disclosures will provide more information that analysts 
can use to assess firms’ fundamental risk, and therefore that analysts’ reliability in assessing 
fundamental risk increases in Specificity.9,10 The above discussion leads to our second hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative form): 
 
H2: The reliability of analysts’ fundamental risk assessment is positively associated with 
the level of specificity in risk-factor disclosures.11 
 
3. Measures and empirical design 
3.1 Specificity measure and validity tests 
Motivated by the SEC’s warning that firms should avoid generic risk-factor disclosures 
that can be applied to any firms, we define a new measure, Specificity, as the number of specific 
words or phrases conveying specific information relevant to the disclosing firm, divided by the 
number of total words in the risk-factor disclosure section (Item 1A). To operationalize the 
construct “specific words or phrases conveying specific information relevant to the disclosing 
                                                 
9 The implicit assumption here is that firms can only choose to disclose or to withhold specificity in risk-factor 
disclosures. They cannot provide misleading or false content. This assumption appears in many analytical works (e.g., 
Dye 1985; Shin 1994; Kumar, Langberg, and Sivaramakrishman 2013). As a practical matter, we control for numerous 
determinants of variations in risk disclosure when testing for the economic consequences of variations in these 
disclosures. 
10 Similar to our hypothesis for investors’ market reactions, additional support can also be found from construal-level 
theory. The firms covered by analysts can be viewed as psychologically close to the analysts because analysts cannot 
issue any reports without extensive research. Analysts refer to those covered firms as firms in “my/our” coverage 
(social); analysts are more “confident” about the performance of those firms (hypothetical); analysts’ predictions are 
based on most “current” data and relevant for “near future” (temporal). 
11 However, alternative arguments exist to support the idea that analysts’ reliability in assessing fundamental risk is 
not affected by the level of specificity in risk-factor disclosures. To the extent that analysts do not pay attention to 
risk-factor disclosure by either unintentionally neglecting or intentionally ignoring such information, as is shown in 
anecdotal evidence, Specificity should not affect analysts’ risk assessments. As an example, consider the argument that 
“risk-factors are looked upon as boilerplate. The irony of it is that risk-factors are almost meant not to be read, or 
relied upon” (Reuters 2005). 
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firm,” we use specific entity names belonging to seven entity categories. Specific entity names 
such as “Microsoft” contain more idiosyncratic details than general words such as “firm.” We 
include a comprehensive set of categories to make sure the specificity measure is driven by a 
particular kind of specific words and, more importantly, that it does not simply reflect firms’ 
business model or complexity. These categories include (1) names of persons, (2) names of 
locations, (3) names of organizations, (4) quantitative values in percentages, (5) money values in 
dollars, (6) times, and (7) dates. 
Our approach is also consistent with the SEC’s call that firms’ risk-factor disclosures 
should not be so generic that they can be applied to any firm. In other words, specific entity names 
tend to be more context-specific. For example, “Our firm has borrowed $100,000 from Microsoft” 
is more relevant to the disclosing firms than “Our firm has borrowed some amount of money from 
a supplier.” The latter sentence can be applied to many other firms. 
To implement this construct on a large-scale sample of risk-factor disclosure documents, 
we use the Named Entity Recognition (NER) technique to identify and extract specific names 
belonging to the above seven entity categories. NER refers to a natural language-processing task 
that seeks to locate and classify atomic elements in text into predefined categories. NER is a key 
technology by which to understand the semantics of plain text, and has enabled recent 
advancements in intelligent systems, such as the IOS Siri system (Berry, Gervasio, Peintner, and 
Yorke-Smith 2011) and Google’s Knowledge Graph (Singhal 2012; Waters 2012).12 In the course 
of system development, state-of-the-art NER systems for English can produce near-human 
                                                 
12 The term “Named Entity” was developed in Message-Understanding Conferences (MUC) in 1995, and has been 
widely used in Information Extraction (IE), Question Answering (QA), and other Natural-Language Processing (NLP) 
applications. Researchers note the importance of recognizing information units such as names and numeric 
expressions, thus extracting these entities is recognized as one of the important sub-tasks of Information Extraction. 
NER systems can now identify more sophisticated categories, such as “Odyssey” as a book title, “Windows” as a 
product name, and “Empire State Building” as a geographical and political entity, and so on. 
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performance. In this paper, we use the Stanford NER tool, which is based on the Conditional 
Random Field model, to predict the Named Entity categories.13 Appendix A provides examples of 
risk-factor disclosures with high and low Specificity. 
We validate Specificity by comparing the scores produced by the NER program with those 
produced by senior accounting students (CPA track) enrolled in a financial accounting theory 
course as well as accounting doctoral students (including several with professional designations). 
We randomly extract 95 risk-factor disclosures (i.e., nineteen firms from each quintile as ranked 
by the NER program) of 1,200–2000 words and ask the students to rate the level of specificity of 
each document. Appendix B provides the instructions we give to the students. The results, based 
on 94 responses, suggest that the level assigned by the NER program is highly consistent with the 
level identified by the student subjects. In untabulated tests, the mean of student ratings changes 
monotonically from high to low when going from the highest to the lowest quintiles as rated by 
the NER program. Without averaging student ratings for each quintile, the correlation between the 
two ratings based on the 94 observations is 0.51, statistically significant at the 0.01 level using a 
two-sided test. We conclude that the validity test provides further comfort that our approach yields 
results similar to what the results would be if the scoring of Specificity were done by “real” 
financial statement users.14 
 
                                                 
13 We use Stanford NER tool13 version 3.2.0 to identify entities in seven categories including Time, Location, 
Organization, Person, Money, Percent, and Date. Finkel, Grenager, and Manning (2005) explain the basic idea of the 
Stanford NER tool. The theory underneath Stanford NER tool is Conditional Random Field (CRF), first introduced 
by Lafferty, McCallum, and Pereira (2001). In our setting, we feed all Item 1A text into the CRF classifier to obtain 
extracted entities along with the categories they belong to.  
14 A securities class action filed on September 3, 2015, against Wayfair for its failure to identify its specific competitor, 
Overstock, when discussing competition risk in the risk-factor section, provides further external validation of the idea 
of counting specific entity names to measure the specificity level of risk-factor disclosures. The class-action lawsuit 
suggests that investors regard specific competitor names as material information, and this provides us external 
validation from the investors’ perspective. (The details of the case can be found at the Stanford securities class action 
database.) 
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3.2 Empirical design 
H1 predicts that Specificity is positively associated with the market reaction to the risk-
factor disclosure in 10-K report. Our research design follows the extant risk-factor disclosure. 
However, instead of being interested in whether risk-factor disclosures move prices up or down, 
we focus on the specificity level of such disclosures. Specifically, we are interested in the textual 
feature of Item 1A and whether greater specificity of that section induces greater market reaction. 
Therefore, unlike Campbell et al. (2014), who examine the relation between signed three-day 
abnormal returns around the 10-K filing date and the amount of risk information disclosed, we 
study the relation between the absolute value of three-day abnormal returns around the 10-K filing 
date, |CAR10-K-1,1|, and Specificity, the main variable of interest.15 Using unsigned abnormal returns 
to measure the information content of risk-factor disclosure has both a theoretical rationale in this 
context and extensive prior empirical support. The model in Heinle and Smith (2015) does not 
provide a directional prediction on the change of stock price in response to risk disclosure. Risk 
disclosures reduce the variance-uncertainty premium and thus the expected cost of capital, while 
also affecting investors’ perceptions of the mean of the variance of cash flows. As a result, the total 
effect on price is unclear. Empirically, there is a long history in research using unsigned, 
unexpected returns (e.g., Beaver 1968; May 1971; Cready and Mynatt 1991; Griffin 2003; Brown 
and Tucker 2011) or unexpected trading volume (see the review by Bamber, Barron, and Stevens 
2011) to measure information content in financial reports. Dating back to Beaver (1968), the 
measures are particularly appropriate when a research question is only concerned with the 
magnitude of the changes in investor expectations rather than the direction of the changes. For 
example, Brown and Tucker (2011) use unsigned market reactions to examine the usefulness of 
                                                 
15 Our approach is consistent with Brown and Tucker (2011), who use unsigned market reactions to examine the 
usefulness of updated MD&A disclosures. 
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updated MD&A disclosures. In the context of risk-factor disclosure, because we are interested only 
in the magnitude and not in the direction of the investors’ expectation changes, we focus on 
unsigned market reaction. 
By examining returns in a narrow event window, we minimize the chances of problems 
with correlated omitted variables. Nevertheless, we include numerous controls motivated by prior 
research.16 We first control for several alternative 10-K report characteristics such as the specificity 
of the entire 10-K report excluding risk-factor disclosures (Specificity 10K), the number of risk-
related words as defined in Campbell et al. (2014) in Item 1A (Amount), the number of times “risk” 
is mentioned in the 10-K as defined in Li (2006) (RiskWords), readability of the 10-K (Fog), and 
10-K report length (TotalLength). 
The second set includes firm characteristics as well as risk proxies, performance measures, 
and firm complexity measures. Most noticeably, we test for the effect of proprietary costs 
(ProprietaryCost) using R&D expense scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (e.g., Albring, 
Banyi, Dhaliwal, and Pereira 2016; Dambra, Field, and Gustafson 2015; Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 
2012; Wang 2007; King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990).). We also control for current performance 
(∆Earnings), total accruals (Accrual), size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BtM), past performance 
(PastLoss), leverage (Leverage), stock-return volatility in the previous year (ReturnVolatility), 
litigation risk (Litigation), the number of business segments (Segments), the number of 8-Ks, and 
analysts’ forecast errors (Analyst Forecast Error; and an indicator for missing values, 
ForecastMissing). As in Brown and Tucker (2011), we additionally control for late filers 
(FileDate), the number of data items in COMPUSTAT (NumItems), and market reaction to the 
                                                 
16 Note that we do not use the same controls for the market-reaction and analyst tests, as we follow prior literature 
when choosing control variables. However, no inferences are impacted if we impose a constant set of controls for both 
analyses. 
17 
 
earnings announcement (|CAREA-1,1|). Finally, we include year and industry (Fama-French 17) 
fixed effects in all regressions.17 All variables are defined in Appendix C. The standard errors are 
two-way clustered by firm and filing month.18 A significant positive α1 in equation (1) supports 
H1 that Specificity is positively related to the market reaction to the 10K file. 
 
|𝐶𝐴𝑅−1,1
10,𝑘 |𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 1𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 10𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡+𝛼6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼13𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼15𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼16𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼17𝑁𝑢𝑚8𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼18𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡+𝛼19𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+𝛼20𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛼21𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡+𝛼22|𝐶𝐴𝑅−1,1
𝐸𝐴 |𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                         (1) 
                                                                                                                             
To test our second hypothesis, we follow Joos et al. (2015), who provide initial evidence 
on the reliability of analysts’ fundamental risk assessment by studying the scenario analyses in 
equity-research reports by analysts at Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley has required its equity 
analysts to use a “risk-reward framework” since 2007. The idea behind this new approach is that 
most sell-side equity research remains outside the risk-return framework, focusing largely on 
single-point estimates. As discussed in Weyns, Perez, Hurewitz, and Jenkins (2011), experienced 
analysts instinctively analyze and weigh the relative importance of risk factors before arriving at 
a recommendation for a stock. Morgan Stanley’s risk-reward approach is a means to encourage 
                                                 
17 Using the Fama-French 48 industry classification does not change our inferences. 
18 No inferences are affected if we instead cluster by firm or by firm and year. 
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analysts to think probabilistically about the ranges of uncertainty related to fundamental value 
drivers. Under this framework, analysts need to provide not only the traditional base-case valuation 
(Base), which is derived from a fundamentals-based analysis of the company’s intrinsic value in 
the following 12 months, but also valuations under both the bull (Bull) and bear (Bear) scenarios. 
The bull and bear case scenarios reflect analysts’ assessment of future price movements and 
fundamental risks. 
 Specifically, Joos et al. (2015) calculate Spread as Bull minus Bear scaled by Base to 
measure analysts’ ex-ante expected price uncertainty. Then they use |UnanticipatedReturn| to 
measure the ex-post absolute estimate error. It is calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between the realized raw return excluding dividends in the following 12 months,
, and the corresponding expected return suggested by the base-case valuation, 
 . They find a significant positive relation between Spread and 
|UnanticipatedReturn|, suggesting that the price spread in analysts’ ex-ante scenario analyses 
reliably reflects the future price movement and thus that analysts reliably assess fundamental risk.  
Motivated by their findings, we include the interaction term  in the 
regression to ascertain whether analysts’ ability in assessing fundamental risk (as reflected in the 
positive relation between Spread and |UnanticipatedReturn|) is positively associated with the level 
of specificity in firms’ risk-factor disclosures. HighSpecificity is an indicator variable which equals 
one if Specificity is in the top quintile and zero if in the bottom quintile (see next section for details). 
365it it
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|𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟|𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼3𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 10𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼13𝐹𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡+𝛼14𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼15∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼17𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼18𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼19𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡                         (2) 
                                                                                                                                                  
A positive α2 in regression equation (2) suggests that the positive relation between 
|UnanticipatedReturn | and Spread is increasing in Specificity, which indicates that a higher level 
of specificity enhances analysts’ reliability in assessing fundamental risk. Again, we control for 
year and industry fixed effects. 
 
4. Data, sample selection, and descriptive statistics 
We obtain our sample in the following steps. First, we download all available 10-Ks from 
2006 to 2011 from SEC EDGAR.19 We then extract risk-factor disclosures from Item 1A in each 
10-K report. We clean up all HTML marks and use the section title to identify the scope of a 
section. For example, a non-empty text between one appearance of “Item 1A Risk-factor” and a 
follow-up appearance of “Item 2” is considered as the content of Item 1A in this report. Second, 
we match the CIK used as identifier in EDGAR with GVKEY (from COMPUSTAT) and 
PERMNO (from CRSP). Firms that cannot be matched with COMPUSTAT and CRSP are dropped 
from the sample. Third, observations with missing data on controls are excluded from the sample. 
                                                 
19 Risk-factor disclosure was mandated from December 2005. For completeness, we also download 10-Ks filed in 
EDGAR in 2005, but few of those files contain risk-factor disclosure sections. 
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This yields a sample of 14,865 firm-year observations for our full sample (market-reaction 
analyses).20 
Panel A of Table 1 provides the sample composition by year. The table shows that our 
sample is distributed evenly across years. It also indicates that, responding to the SEC’s call for 
more specific risk disclosure, firms increase their risk disclosures (i.e., more words) and disclose 
more specific information, but the increase in specific words or phrases is slower than the increase 
in the length of the risk-factor section. In other words, although firms are providing longer risk-
factor disclosure sections, they do not increase the specificity proportionally. 
Table 1, Panel B provides the sample composition by Fama-French 17 industry 
classification. There is some concentration in “other” (30.67%), banking and insurance (21.43%), 
and machinery and business equipment (12.97%); otherwise the sample is not dominated by any 
industry.21 Among all the industries, utilities, mining and minerals, and transportation are the top 
three in terms of Specificity. The table also shows that the ranking of Specificity is not only driven 
by the length of Item 1A (the denominator). For example, although firms in mining and minerals 
provide the second-longest risk-factor disclosures (Item 1A), the length does not drive down their 
level of specificity. The average Specificity of mining and minerals firms still ranks second among 
all industries. 
To carry out the empirical analysis of analysts’ risk assessment, we hand-collect analysts’ 
reports from Investext and manually extract the scenario-analysis parts of the reports. Because of 
the high cost of hand-collecting data, we choose to study the sample firms’ risk-factor disclosures 
                                                 
20 We use a different method from Campbell et al. (2014) to extract Item 1A from 10-K reports. However, the size of 
our extracted sample is comparable to theirs.  
21 For the smaller sample with available scenario analyses from Morgan Stanley analysts, untabulated statistics show 
that the sample covers a variety of industries. 
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only with the level of specificity ranking in the top and bottom quintiles.22 In addition to lowering 
(the already high) data collection costs, focusing on the group indicator (top versus bottom 
quintile) instead of a continuous measure makes the results easier to interpret. Our sample is from 
2007 to 2011 because Morgan Stanley only requires the scenario risk analysis since 2007. We then 
manually match the available scenario-analysis information from Investext with the selected firms. 
Two hundred sixty firm-year observations (142 firms) from the top quintile and 367 firm-year 
observations (189 firms) from the bottom quintile are matched. This yields a final sample of 627 
observations.23 Although focusing on only Morgan Stanley analysts limits the generalization of 
our inferences, examining analysts’ reports from one brokerage firm is an advantage due to internal 
consistency across the reports and the fact that we do not need to control for brokerage-firm 
characteristics. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical 
analyses about market reactions to specific risk-factor disclosures. The mean for Specificity is 
0.054, suggesting that, on average, firms include five words describing specific entities per 100 
words used in the risk-factor disclosures. The mean for the absolute value of the three-day 
abnormal return around 10-K file date is 4%, whereas the absolute value of the three-day abnormal 
return around earnings announcement is 6%. The mean of FileDate indicates that only 4% of the 
sample firms are late 10-K filers. Finally, the descriptive statistics on Litigation suggest that 28% 
of our sample firms are in industries with high litigation risks. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical 
analysis on analysts’ fundamental risk assessment. The mean for Spread is 0.63, suggesting that 
                                                 
22 In contrast, for the market reaction tests we are able to utilize the full sample of firms. 
23 This data-collection process shows that analyst coverage is not significantly related to Specificity, and that analyst 
coverage is not concentrated in the high Specificity group but rather distributes slightly toward the bottom group. 
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the average spread between the bull and bear case forecast is 63% of the base case value. The mean 
for the HighSpecificity indicator is 0.41.24 The mean for the absolute value of unanticipated returns 
is 20%, indicating that, on average, analysts’ base-case forecast for the one-year-ahead stock price 
is 20 percent higher or lower than the realized price 12 months after. 
Panel C of Table 2 shows that Specificity has a lower mean for risk-factor disclosures than 
for the rest of the 10-K and the MD&A section. This finding is consistent with the criticism from 
practitioners that risk disclosures are often boilerplate (and works against our finding support for 
our hypotheses). We further observe that the Pearson correlations among different sections in terms 
of specificity are quite low. 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Determinants of Specificity 
As explained above, we are primarily interested in testing the economic consequences of 
variations in Specificity. However, it is also interesting to explore which factors drive these 
variations. Also, it is potentially important to consider these in the tests for economic 
consequences, to control for potential endogeneity of risk-factor specificity. In our empirical 
analyses, we provide such control by adding the determinants as control variables to the 
regressions following prior literature on textual analysis of 10-K files (Li 2008). Thus, in this 
section, we first present results of the determinants of the level of specificity in risk-factor 
disclosures before we show how Specificity affects investors and analysts.  
                                                 
24 The mean of HighSpecificity is not equal to 0.50 because we manually match Morgan Stanley analysts’ reports with 
the top and bottom quintiles extracted from all sample risk-factor disclosures. A greater number of firms in the bottom 
quintile are matched, which leads to the mean of HighSpecificity being smaller than 0.5. As a robustness check, we 
reclassify the sample into two groups based on Specificity. We define HighSpecificity as an indicator variable which 
equals one when Specificity is above the sample median and zero otherwise. Conclusions are unaltered with this 
approach. 
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Table 3 presents the results of regressing Specificity on the potential determinants. Most 
importantly, we find that firms facing higher proprietary costs are less likely to provide specific 
risk-factor disclosures. This finding is consistent with prior disclosure literature and provides a 
rationale for why not all firms choose to provide specific disclosure. Because of the importance of 
proprietary costs, we further explore their role when examining market reactions in Section 5.2.2. 
Several other variables are also significant. For example, Specificity is positively and significantly 
related to Specificity 10K, Amount, TotalLength, ReturnVolatility, and Analyst Forecast Error.25 
 
5.2 Specificity and stock-market reactions 
We start by examining the stock-market consequences of specific risk-factor disclosures 
using the full sample of firms. Table 4 presents result of regressing |CAR10-K-1,1| on Specificity, 
controlling for the amount of risk-related information disclosed in Item 1A (Amount) and other 
variables suggested in the literature on short-window market reactions. We additionally control for 
all determinants included in Table 3.26 
The coefficient on Specificity is positive (0.0267) and significant at the 0.05 level using a 
two-sided test (Column 1). This result supports H1 that a higher level of specificity in firms’ risk-
factor disclosures leads to stronger market reactions to 10-K reports (i.e., that the information 
content increases with Specificity).27 The coefficients on Size and |CAREA-1,1| are significant and 
consistent with findings in the prior literature. 28  Specificity 10-K and TotalLength are also 
                                                 
25 In untabulated analyses we consider institutional ownership and the Herfindahl Index as additional determinants of 
Specificity. Including these variables does not increase the explanatory power of the model (and reduces the sample 
size by 11%). More importantly, their inclusion does not affect any inferences for our market-reaction and risk-
assessment analyses. 
26 No inferences are affected if we exclude any of the control variables. 
27 In terms of economic significance, if Specificity is increased by one standard deviation (and other variables are held 
unchanged), the market reaction increases by 8 basis points. This effect is similar to that of Specificity-10K and 
Amount, greater than that of Fog and RiskWords, and smaller than that of TotalLength. 
28 The earnings announcement precedes the 10-K filing date, and we control for any earnings-announcement effect 
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positively and significantly related to market reactions. The signs of coefficients on most other 
control variables are consistent with prior literature, but not all estimates are significant.29,30 
In untabulated analyses we explore which components of Specificity contribute most to the 
information content of risk-factor disclosures. First, if we separate the seven individual items into 
quantitative (Money, Percentage, Date, and Time) and qualitative groups (Organization, Person, 
and Location), we find that the specificity of quantitative (qualitative) disclosure is highly 
significant (directionally consistent but not statistically significant). Second, when we consider the 
components individually, Money and Dates are the most significant. 
As an alternative widely used measure of the information content of Specificity we consider 
trading volume. While stock-price reactions are determined by the average investor’s belief about 
a specific event, trading-volume reactions are induced by the different beliefs about the future 
price among individual investors (e.g., Beaver 1968; Bamber and Cheon 1995). As a result, 
trading-volume reactions can exist without the price reaction, and vice versa. Following the event-
study literature (e.g., MacKinlay 1997), we define the 10-K file date as day 0 (event date), and we 
measure abnormal trading volume as the average daily trading volume in the three-day event 
window [-1, +1] minus the average daily trading volume in the [-60, -11] window, scaled by the 
trading volume in the [-60, -11] period.31 We find that Specificity is positively associated with 
                                                 
(|CAREA-1,1|) following prior literature. 
29 Because year 2006 is the first year after risk-factor disclosures are required, the effects that year could either be 
weaker due to the transition period’s weaker regulatory enforcement or stronger due to more attention being paid to 
the new section of information. Excluding year 2006 from the full sample does not affect any conclusions. Further, 
the negative coefficient for NumItems likely relates to its correlation (0.5) with Segments. If we exclude Segments, the 
estimated coefficient on NumItems is positive and our other inferences do not change. 
30 It is important to note that even if the Specificity score does not change from one risk disclosure to the next, this 
does not imply that there is no new information provided in the risk disclosures. Specifically, the risk disclosures could 
contain completely new information while the specificity level remains the same; thus our setting is different from the 
typical disclosure setting in the accounting literature. Nevertheless, as an untabulated sensitivity analysis we 
implement a changes specification in which we use the first difference of both the dependent and all the independent 
variables. The estimated coefficients on the change in Specificity are positive and statistically significant for both 
returns and volume, providing further support to our primary analyses. 
31 If the [-60, -11] window includes earnings announcements, the trading volume data in three-day windows around 
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abnormal trading volume. Specifically, Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on 
Specificity is positive (0.710) and significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test).32 This finding 
corroborates the primary analysis based on stock-price reactions.33,34 
 
5.2.1 Pseudo analysis 
Our multivariate analyses contain numerous variables motivated by extant research. These 
variables control for factors known to affect short-window stock-market reactions and for 
determinants of variations in risk-factor specificity. However, in order to further mitigate the 
possibility that Specificity measures some unobservable firm or firm-report characteristics that are 
significantly correlated with stock-market reactions, we design and implement a pseudo analysis. 
Specifically, in the years from 2001 to 2004, when risk-factor disclosures were not required by the 
SEC, we repeat the market-reaction test using Specificity calculated based on risk-factor 
disclosures from 10-K reports filed in 2006 as a pseudo Specificity measure. If this Specificity 
captures some unknown stable features significantly explaining the market reaction, then the 
pseudo Specificity should be significantly related to the market reaction even when the real 
Specificity is not available. The result in Table 5 (first column) shows that this is not the case. 
Using the same specification as the market-reaction test, the coefficient of Specificity from the 
                                                 
the announcements are excluded in calculation. 
32 An increase in Specificity of one standard deviation is associated with an increase in abnormal trading volume of 
2%. This is similar to the effect for Amount and TotalLength and greater than the effect for Specificity-10K, Fog, and 
RiskWords. 
33 In untabulated analysis, we alternatively use the number of shares outstanding at the most recent fiscal quarter end 
as scalar. For Specificity, the estimated coefficient continues to be positive and significant at the 0.05 level. In another 
untabulated test we reestimate Specificity without removing filler words. Using this measure, both the abnormal returns 
and volume effects are significant at the 0.05 level. 
34 As explained, in this study we are interested in the textual feature of Item IA and whether greater specificity of 
disclosure induces greater market reaction. However, to compare with prior research by Campbell et al. (2014) and 
Kravet and Muslu (2013), we reestimate using signed returns as the dependent variable. Specifically, we test whether 
the effect documented by Campbell et al. (2014) is amplified for high-Specificity firms. In untabulated analyses we 
find that this is indeed the case (i.e., the interaction term is negative with a t-value of 1.96). 
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pseudo test is not significant (t = 0.569). This finding suggests that our previously documented 
significant and positive relation between Specificity and market reaction is not driven by Specificity 
being a proxy for unknown features related to market reaction. We also perform this pseudo 
analysis using abnormal trading volume, and similarly find no significant effect of the pseudo 
Specificity measure (second column). 
 
5.2.2. Cross-sectional effects of proprietary costs 
In Table 3 we observe that firms with high proprietary costs are less likely to provide 
specific risk disclosures. In this section, we partition our sample based on the level of proprietary 
costs and test whether the information content for the firms that provide more generic disclosure 
is lower. Table 6 shows that, both for returns and volume tests, Specificity is only significant in the 
low-proprietary-costs subsamples, consistent with the information content of risk disclosures only 
being discernible among firms that have sufficient (net) incentives to provide specific disclosure 
in the first place.35 
 
5.3 Specificity and analysts’ risk assessment 
We now turn to our tests of analysts’ risk assessments. Table 7 presents the results of 
examining H2. In the first column, we replicate the result in Joos et al. (2015) in our hand-collected 
sample. Joos et al. (2015) find a significantly positive coefficient on Spread. Our result is consistent 
with theirs. The coefficient on Spread, 0.11, is positive and statistically significant (t = 1.954). This 
result is in line with what Joos et al. (2015) find and suggests that analysts reliably assess 
                                                 
35 We partition based on whether the sample firms have non-zero R&D costs or not (zero R&D is also the median for 
the sample). Whereas the difference in coefficient estimates across partitions is significant for the volume test it is 
insignificant for the returns test. 
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fundamental risks. 
In the second column, we add the interaction term Spread×HighSpecificity and the main 
effect HighSpecificity to examine whether the level of specificity in risk-factor disclosures affects 
analysts’ reliability in assessing fundamental risk (as reflected in the significant relation between 
the ex-post base-case forecast error and the ex-ante price spread that is forecasted in scenario 
analyses). The coefficient on Spread is no longer significant. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
interaction term Spread×HighSpecificity, 0.112, is significantly positive (p<0.05, using a two-
sided test). These results indicate that high specificity helps analysts make better estimations (and 
that analysts’ reliability in assessing fundamental risk mainly comes from firms that disclose risk 
factors with greater specificity). In addition, the coefficient on HighSpecificity is significantly 
negative, suggesting that a higher level of specificity associates with a lower ex-post analyst 
forecast error. Adding interactions of spread with all other qualitative disclosure features 
(Specificity 10-K, Fog, RiskWords, and Amount) into the regression does not change our 
conclusions (untabulated). 
While the above results support H2 that analysts’ reliability in assessing risks is increased 
with the level of specificity in risk-factor disclosure, they do not show a direct relation between 
specificity and analysts’ risk assessment. Table 8 presents the result of regressing Spread on 
HighSpecificity, Amount, and other firm characteristics. The coefficient on HighSpecificity, 
−0.0338, is significantly negative, indicating that for the higher Specificity group, the Spread is 
smaller. This result further suggests that for firms with a higher Specificity, analysts are less 
uncertain about future price movement, and the spreads in their forecasts are narrower.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
We develop a new measure of the degree of specificity in firms’ risk-factor disclosures 
(Item 1A in the 10-K report), and we investigate whether specificity is positively associated with 
stock-market reactions to the 10-K file and whether more specific risk-factor disclosures enhance 
analysts’ reliability in assessing firms’ fundamental risk. 
We document that the short-window market reaction to the 10-K file increases in 
Specificity. This finding is robust to the inclusion of numerous controls and to various robustness 
tests, and is consistent with the idea that investors find specific risk disclosures incrementally 
valuable in assessing firms’ accounting information. We find consistent evidence when using 
abnormal trading volume as an alternative measure of information content. Further, we show that 
the information content of Specificity is a function of firms’ proprietary costs. 
Moreover, employing a sample of Morgan Stanley analysts’ scenario analyses, we find that 
analysts’ ex-ante bull-bear price spread is significantly positively correlated with the ex-post base 
case forecast error when Specificity is high, suggesting that analysts’ forecasted spread reliably 
pictures future price movement; however, such a relation does not exist for risk-factor disclosure 
with low Specificity. These results indicate that more specific risk-factor disclosures enhance 
analysts’ risk understanding. A caveat associated with these findings is that they are based on a 
relatively small, hand-collected sample of firms, covered by analysts from one financial institution. 
However, the strengths of this approach include internal consistency across firms and not having 
to control for brokerage-firm characteristics. 
This study is the first to introduce a measure of the risk-factor specificity level, and to relate 
firms’ risk-disclosure practices to investor reactions and to analysts’ ability to assess risk. The 
results support the SEC’s call for more specific risk disclosures by showing that investors respond 
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to the information contained in risk-factor disclosures, consistent with investors benefiting from 
more specific disclosures. Our empirical findings provide support for the theory predictions in 
Heinle and Smith (2015) and suggest that the level of specificity in risk disclosures does affect 
investors’ and analysts’ evaluations. Finally, by introducing a novel level of specificity measure 
from the machine-learning domain (and validating this measure through the use of human 
subjects), we open the possibility for future research to continue our work in assessing disclosure 
quality in different fields.36 
  
                                                 
36 There are many opportunities to apply Specificity in accounting research. As but two examples, segment reporting 
and major customer identification seem fertile grounds in which to employ this new measure. 
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Appendix A: Examples of risk-factor disclosure with high and low Specificity  
Example with high Specificity: risk-factor disclosures from Williams Controls (December 
2007) 
ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS  
     An investment in our common stock involves a high degree of risk. You should carefully consider the risks 
discussed below and the other information in this report on Form 10-K before deciding whether to invest in our 
common stock. 
Risks related to our business: 
A significant portion of our sales are derived from a limited number of customers, and results of operations could 
be adversely affected and stockholder value harmed if we lose any of these customers. 
     A significant portion of our revenues historically have been derived from a limited number of customers. For the 
years ended September 30, 2007, 2006 and 2005, The Volvo Group accounted for 17%, 16% and 18%, Paccar, Inc. 
accounted for 14%, 17% and 17%, Freightliner, LLC accounted for 13%, 17% and 18%, Navistar International 
Corporation accounted for 6%, 8% and 7% and Caterpillar, Inc. accounted for 6%, 5% and 5%, of net sales from 
continuing operations, respectively. The loss of any significant customer would adversely affect our revenues and 
stockholder value. 
Demand for equipment on which our products are installed may decrease, which could adversely affect our 
revenues and stockholder value. 
     We sell our products primarily to manufacturers of heavy trucks, transit busses and off-road equipment. If 
demand for our customers’ vehicles or equipment decreases, demand for our products would decrease as well. This 
decrease in demand would adversely impact our revenues and stockholder value. 
Our products could be recalled, which could increase our costs and decrease our revenues. 
     Our vehicle component products must comply with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 
as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder, which are administered by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”). If NHTSA finds that we are not in compliance with its standards or regulations, 
it may, among other things, require that we recall products found not to be in compliance, and repair or replace such 
products. Such a recall could increase our costs and adversely impact our reputation in our industry, both of which 
would adversely affect our revenues, profit margins, results of operations and stockholder value. We experienced 
such a recall with respect to certain of our products in fiscal 2001. 
We purchase raw materials and component parts from suppliers and changes in the relationships with such 
suppliers, as well as increases in the costs of such raw materials and/or component parts, would adversely affect 
our ability to produce and market our products, which would adversely affect our profit margins, results from 
operations and stockholder value. 
     We purchase raw materials and component parts from suppliers to be used in the manufacturing of our products. 
If a supplier is unable or unwilling to provide us with such raw materials and/or component parts, we may be unable 
to produce certain products, which could result in a decrease in revenue and adversely impact our reputation in our 
industry. Also, if prices of such raw materials and/or component parts increase and we are not able to pass on such 
increase to our customers, our profit margins would decrease. The occurrence of either of these would adversely 
affect our results from operations and stockholder value. 
Our products could be subject to product liability claims by customers and/or consumers, which would adversely 
affect our profit margins, results from operations and stockholder value. 
     A significant portion of our products are used on heavy trucks and transit busses. If our products are not properly 
designed or built and/or personal injuries are sustained as a result of our equipment, we could be subject to claims 
for damages based on theories of product liability and other legal theories. We maintain liability insurance for these 
risks; however, the costs and resources to defend such claims could be substantial, and if such claims are successful, 
we could be responsible for paying some or all of the damages. Also, our reputation could be adversely affected, 
regardless of whether such claims are successful. Any of these results would adversely affect our profit margins, 
results from operations and stockholder value. We are currently named as a co-defendant in a product liability case 
that seeks class action. Refer to ITEM 3 – LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Work stoppages or other changes in the relationships with our employees could make it difficult for us to produce 
and effectively market our products, which would adversely affect our profit margins, results from operations and 
stockholder value. 
     If we experience significant work stoppages, as we did in fiscal 2003, we likely would have difficulty 
manufacturing our products. Also, our labor costs could increase and we may not be able to pass such increase on to 
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our customers. The occurrence of either of the foregoing would adversely affect profit margins, results from 
operations and stockholder value. 
Our defined benefit pension plans are under-funded and, therefore, we may be required to increase our 
contributions to the plans, which would adversely affect our cash flows. 
     We maintain two defined benefit pension plans among the retirement plans we sponsor. No new employees are 
being admitted to participate in these two plans. Participants in these two plans are entitled to a fixed formula benefit 
upon retirement. Although we make regular contributions to these two plans in accordance with minimum ERISA 
funding requirements, investment earnings may be less than expected, and we may be required to increase 
contributions to the under-funded plan(s), which would adversely affect our cash flows. 
Risks related to environmental laws: 
The soil and groundwater at our Portland, Oregon facility contains certain contaminants that may require us to 
incur substantial expense to investigate and remediate, which would adversely affect our profit margins, results 
from operations and stockholder value. 
     The soil and groundwater at our Portland, Oregon facility contain certain contaminants. Some of this 
contamination has migrated offsite to neighboring properties and potentially to other properties. We have retained an 
environmental consulting firm to investigate the extent of the contamination and to determine what, if any, 
remediation will be required and the associated costs. During the third quarter of fiscal 2004, we entered the Oregon 
Department of Environmental Quality’s voluntary clean-up program and during fiscal 2004 we established a liability 
of $950 for this matter. At September 30, 2007, we recorded an additional liability of $546 and as of September 30, 
2007, this liability totaled $1,046. Our overall costs could exceed this liability, which could adversely affect our 
profit margins, results from operations and stockholder value.  
We are required to comply with federal and state environmental laws, which could become increasingly expensive 
and could result in substantial liability if we do not comply.  
     We produce small quantities of hazardous waste in our operations and are subject to federal and state air, water 
and land pollution control laws and regulations. Compliance with such laws and regulations could become 
increasingly costly and the failure to comply could result in substantial liability. Either of these results could 
increase expenses, thereby adversely affecting our profit margins and stockholder value. 
Risks related to foreign operations:  
Fluctuations in the value of currencies could adversely affect our international sales, which would result in 
reduced revenues and stockholder value.  
     We sell products in Canada, Belgium, Sweden, Mexico, South America, the Pacific Rim nations, Australia, 
China and certain European nations, purchase components from suppliers in China and Europe, have a 
manufacturing and sales operation in China, and a sales and technical center in Germany. For the years ended 
September 30, 2007, 2006 and 2005, foreign sales were approximately 41%, 36%, and 35% of net sales, 
respectively. Although currently virtually all of our sales and purchases are made in U.S. dollars, we anticipate that 
over time more of our purchases of component parts and sales of our products will be denominated in foreign 
currencies. We do not presently engage in any hedging of foreign currency risk. In the future, our operations in the 
foreign markets will likely become subject to fluctuations in currency values between the U.S. dollar and the 
currency of the foreign markets. Our results from operations and stockholder value could be adversely affected if 
currency of any of the foreign markets increases in value relative to the U.S. dollar. 
Complying with the laws applicable to foreign markets may become more difficult and expensive in the future, 
which could adversely affect our results from operations and stockholder value. 
     Our operations in foreign markets are subject to the laws of such markets. Compliance with these laws may 
become more difficult and costly in the future. In addition, these laws may change and such change may require us 
to change our operations. Any of these results could adversely affect our results from operations and stockholder 
value by increasing expenses and reducing revenues, thereby reducing profits. 
Political and economic instability in the foreign markets may make doing business there more difficult and 
costly, which could adversely affect our results from operations and stockholder value. 
     Economic and political instability may increase in the future in foreign markets. Such instability may make it 
more difficult to do business in those countries, may make it more expensive to do so and could disrupt supplies of 
components into our Portland or Suzhou facilities. If our operations were nationalized by the government of China, 
this could cause us to write off the value of our operations in such foreign markets and eliminate revenues generated 
by such operations. Any of these results could result in onetime charges or increased expenses as well as lower 
revenues, which would adversely affect our results of operations and harm stockholder value. 
Risks Related to our Capital Structure: 
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The market price of our stock has been and may continue to be volatile, which could result in losses for 
stockholders. 
     Our common stock is currently listed on the NASDAQ Capital Market and is thinly traded. Prior to October 9, 
2006 our stock was traded on the OTC Bulletin Board. Volatility of thinly traded stocks is typically higher than the 
volatility of more liquid stocks with higher trading volumes. The market price of our common stock has been and, in 
the future, could be subject to significant fluctuations as a result of the foregoing, as well as variations in our 
operating results, announcements of technological innovations or new products by us or our competitors, 
announcements of new strategic relationships by us or our competitors, general conditions in our industries or 
market conditions unrelated to our business and operating results. Any of these results could adversely impact 
stockholder value. 
 
Example with low Specificity: risk-factor disclosures from Tennant Company (March 2010) 
  
We may encounter additional financial difficulties if the United States or other global economies continue to 
experience a significant long-term economic downturn, decreasing the demand for our products. 
 To the extent that the U.S. and other global economies experience a continued significant long-term economic 
downturn, our revenues could decline to the point that we may have to take additional cost saving measures to reduce 
our fixed costs to a level that is in line with a lower level of sales in order to stay in business long-term in a depressed 
economic environment. Our product sales are sensitive to declines in capital spending by our customers. Decreased 
demand for our products could result in decreased revenues, profitability and cash flows and may impair our ability 
to maintain our operations and fund our obligations to others. 
 We may not be able to effectively manage organizational changes which could negatively impact our operating 
results or financial condition. 
 We are continuing to integrate acquired companies into our business and adjust to reduced staffing levels as a result 
of our workforce reduction. This consolidation and reallocation of resources is part of our ongoing efforts to optimize 
our cost structure in the current economy. Our operating results may be negatively impacted if we are unable to manage 
these organizational changes either by failing to incorporate new employees from acquired businesses or failing to 
assimilate the work of the positions that are eliminated as part of our actions to reduce headcount. In addition, if we 
do not effectively manage the transition of our reduced headcount, we may not fully realize the anticipated savings of 
these actions or they may negatively impact our ability to serve our customers or meet our strategic objectives. 
 We may not be able to effectively optimize the allocation of Company resources to our strategic objectives, which 
could adversely affect our operating results. 
 The decline in the global economy has constrained resources that are available to allocate among strategic business 
objectives. If we are not able to appropriately prioritize our objectives, we risk allocating our resources to projects that 
do not accomplish our strategic objectives most effectively, which could result in increased costs and could adversely 
impact our operating results. 
 We are subject to competitive risks associated with developing innovative products and technologies, which 
generally cost more than our competitors’ products. 
 Our products are sold in competitive markets throughout the world. Competition is based on product features and 
design, brand recognition, reliability, durability, technology, breadth of product offerings, price, customer 
relationships, and after-sale service. Although we believe that the performance and price characteristics of our products 
will provide competitive solutions for our customers’ needs, because of our dedication to innovation and continued 
investments in research and development, our products generally cost more than our competitor’s products. We believe 
that customers will pay for the innovation and quality in our products; however, in the current economic environment, 
it may be difficult for us to compete with lower cost products offered by our competitors and there can be no assurance 
that our customers will continue to choose our products over products offered by our competitors. If our products, 
markets and services are not competitive, we may experience a decline in sales, pricing, and market share, which 
adversely impacts revenues, margin, and the success of our operations. 
 We may not be able to adequately acquire, retain and protect our proprietary intellectual property rights which 
could put us at a competitive disadvantage. 
 We rely on trade secret, copyright, trademark and patent laws and contractual protections to protect our proprietary 
technology and other proprietary rights. Our competitors may attempt to copy our products or gain access to our trade 
secrets. Our efforts to secure patent protection on our inventions may be unsuccessful. Notwithstanding the precautions 
we take to protect our intellectual property rights, it is possible that third parties may illegally copy or otherwise obtain 
and use our proprietary technology without our consent. Any litigation concerning infringement could result in 
substantial cost to us and diversions of our resources, either of which could adversely affect our business. In some 
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cases, there may be no effective legal recourse against duplication of products or services by competitors. Intellectual 
property rights in foreign jurisdictions may be limited or unavailable. Patents of third parties also have an important 
bearing on our ability to offer some of our products and services. Our competitors may obtain patents related to the 
types of products and services we offer or plan to offer. Any infringement by us on intellectual property rights of others 
could result in litigation and adversely affect our ability to continue to provide, or could increase the cost of providing, 
our products and services. 
 We may encounter difficulties as we invest in changes to our processes and computer systems that are foundational 
to our ability to maintain and manage our systems data. 
 We rely on our computer systems to effectively manage our business, serve our customers and report financial data. 
Our current systems are adequate for our current business operations; however, we are in the process of standardizing 
our processes and the way we utilize our computer systems with the objective that we will improve our ability to 
effectively maintain and manage our systems data so that as our business grows, our processes will be able to more 
efficiently handle this growth. There are inherent risks in changing processes and systems data and if we are not 
successful in our attempts to improve our data and system processes, we may experience higher costs or an interruption 
in our business which could adversely impact our ability to serve our customers and our operating results. 
  We may be unable to conduct business if we experience a significant business interruption in our computer 
systems, manufacturing plants or distribution facilities for a significant period of time. 
 We rely on our computer systems, manufacturing plants and distribution facilities to efficiently operate our business. 
If we experience an interruption in the functionality in any of these items for a significant period of time, we may not 
have adequate business continuity planning contingencies in place to allow us to continue our normal business 
operations on a long-term basis. Significant long-term interruption in our business could cause a decline in sales, an 
increase in expenses and could adversely impact our operating results. 
 We are subject to product liability claims and product quality issues that could adversely affect our operating 
results or financial condition. 
 Our business exposes us to potential product liability risks that are inherent in the design, manufacturing and 
distribution of our products. If products are used incorrectly by our customers, injury may result leading to product 
liability claims against us. Some of our products or product improvements may have defects or risks that we have not 
yet identified that may give rise to product quality issues, liability and warranty claims. If product liability claims are 
brought against us for damages that are in excess of our insurance coverage or for uninsured liabilities and it is 
determined we are liable, our business could be adversely impacted. Any losses we suffer from any liability claims, 
and the effect that any product liability litigation may have upon the reputation and marketability of our products, may 
have a negative impact on our business and operating results. We could experience a material design or manufacturing 
failure in our products, a quality system failure, other safety issues, or heightened regulatory scrutiny that could 
warrant a recall of some of our products. Any unforeseen product quality problems could result in loss of market share, 
reduced sales, and higher warranty expense. 
 We may encounter difficulties obtaining raw materials or component parts needed to manufacture our products 
and the prices of these materials are subject to fluctuation. 
 Raw materials and commodity-based components. As a manufacturer, our sales and profitability are dependent 
upon availability and cost of raw materials, which are subject to price fluctuations, and the ability to control or pass 
on an increase in costs of raw materials to our customers. We purchase raw materials, such as steel, rubber, lead and 
petroleum-based resins and components containing these commodities for use in our manufacturing operations. The 
availability of these raw materials is subject to market forces beyond our control. Under normal circumstances, these 
materials are generally available on the open market from a variety of sources. From time to time, however, the prices 
and availability of these raw materials and components fluctuate due to global market demands, which could impair 
our ability to procure necessary materials, or increase the cost of such materials. Inflationary and other increases in 
the costs of these raw materials and components have occurred in the past and may recur from time to time, and our 
financial performance depends in part on our ability to incorporate changes in costs into the selling prices for our 
products. Freight costs associated with shipping and receiving product and sales and service vehicle fuel costs are 
impacted by fluctuations in the cost of oil and gas. We do not use derivative commodity instruments to manage our 
exposure to changes in commodity prices such as steel, oil, gas and lead. Any fluctuations in the supply or prices for 
any of these commodities could have a material adverse effect on our profit margins and financial condition. 
 Single-source supply. We depend on many suppliers for the necessary parts to manufacture our products. However, 
there are some components that are purchased from a single supplier due to price, quality, technology or other business 
constraints. These components cannot be quickly or inexpensively re-sourced to another supplier. If we are unable to 
purchase on acceptable terms or experience significant delays or quality issues in the delivery of these necessary parts 
or components from a particular vendor and we need to locate a new supplier for these parts and components, 
37 
 
shipments for products impacted could be delayed, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, 
financial condition and results of operations. 
 We are subject to a number of regulatory and legal risks associated with doing business in the United States and 
international markets. 
 Our business and our products are subject to a wide range of international, federal, state and local laws, rules and 
regulations, including, but not limited to, data privacy laws, anti-trust regulations, employment laws, product labeling 
and regulatory requirements, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and similar anti-bribery regulations. Many of these 
requirements are challenging to comply with as there are frequent changes and many inconsistencies across the various 
jurisdictions. Any violation of these laws or regulations could lead to significant fines and/or penalties could limit our 
ability to conduct business in those jurisdictions and could cause us to incur additional operating and compliance costs. 
 We are subject to risks associated with changes in foreign currency exchange rates. 
 We are exposed to market risks from changes in foreign currency exchange rates. As a result of our increasing 
international presence, we have experienced an increase in transactions and balances denominated in currencies other 
than the U.S. dollar. There is a direct financial impact of foreign currency exchange when translating profits from local 
currencies to U.S. dollars. Our primary exposure is to transactions denominated in the Euro, British pound, Australian 
and Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, Chinese yuan and Brazilian real. Any significant change in the value of the 
currencies of the countries in which we do business against the U.S. dollar could affect our ability to sell products 
competitively and control our cost structure. Because a substantial portion of our products are manufactured in the 
United States, a stronger U.S. dollar generally has a negative impact on results from operations outside the United 
States while a weaker dollar generally has a positive effect. Unfavorable changes in exchange rates between the U.S. 
dollar and these currencies impact the cost of our products sold internationally and could significantly reduce our 
reported sales and earnings. We periodically enter into contracts, principally forward exchange contracts, to protect 
the value of certain of our foreign currency-denominated assets and liabilities. The gains and losses on these contracts 
generally approximate changes in the value of the related assets and liabilities. However, all foreign currency 
exposures cannot be fully hedged, and there can be no assurances that our future results of operations will not be 
adversely affected by currency fluctuation. 
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Appendix B: Validity test instructions 
Assignment – Evaluation of the specificity level of risk disclosures 
  
Name ____________________________        
 
You are randomly assigned the risk disclosures from the financial statements of FIVE different 
companies. You are asked to evaluate the level of specificity of these risk disclosures. The 
definition of specific risk disclosure is provided below: 
 
A piece of risk disclosure is defined as specific if it contains information that cannot be applied to 
other firms. In other words, information is considered to be more specific when the disclosure 
contains more detailed information specifically about the disclosing firm.  
 
Please rate each sample firm into one of the following five levels:  
 
Very specific:     5 
Specific:     4 
Specific to not very specific:   3 
Not very specific:   2 
Not specific at all:    1 
 
The following examples with constructed hypothetical sentences are for illustration.  
 
Google’s main business in United States Google Search, accounting 30% of the profit, is facing 
fierce competition from Microsoft’s Bing.       (5) 
Google’s main business in United States Google Search is facing fierce competition from 
Microsoft’s Bing.           (4) 
Google’s main business in United States is facing fierce competition from Microsoft.  (3) 
The firm’s main business in United States is facing fierce competition from other firms.  (2) 
The firm’s main business is facing fierce competition globally from other firms.   (1) 
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Appendix C: Variable definitions 
Dependent variables 
|Unanticipated-return| 
  
The absolute value of the difference between the one-year ahead 
realized raw return and the Base. Base is the forecast for the one-year 
ahead stock price in the first analyst report with scenario analysis 
issued by Morgan Stanley after the firm files 10-K report for year t. 
|CAR10k-1,1| 
The absolute value of the difference between the three-day stock 
return starting one trading day before the 10-K release and ending one 
trading day after and the expected return estimated using the Fama-
French three-factor model. 
ABVOL10-K-1,1 
Average daily trading volume in three-day window around 10-K file 
date in excess of the mean daily trading volume in the [-60, -11] 
trading day window (scaled by the [-60, -11] period volume), 
excluding the trading volume data in three-day window around 
earnings announcements. Day 0 is defined as the 10-K file date. 
 
Independent variables 
Specificity The number of specific words identified by the Stanford NER 
program in Item 1A in the 10-K report divided by the number of total 
words in Item 1A after stop-words removed. The list of stop words is 
from Python natural language processing package.  
Specificity 10K The number of specific words identified by the Stanford NER 
program in the 10-K report divided by the number of total words in 
10-K report after stop-words removed. The list of stop words is from 
Python natural language processing package. 
Amount The log of the number of one plus the risk-related words in Item 1A. 
The risk-related words are identified using dictionaries developed in 
Campbell et al. (2014).
 RiskWords The log of one plus the total number of word “risk” and its derivative 
words defined in Li (2006) in 10-Ks. 
Fog Fog index downloaded from Feng Li’s website.
 
TotalLength The log of the number of all words in the10-K file.
 
Spread 
  
Bull and Bear are the bull-case and bear-case forecasts for the one-
365Pr Pr Pr
Pr Pr
it it it it
it it
ice ice Base ice
ice ice
  
it it
it
Bull Bear
Base

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year ahead stock price contained in the first analyst report with 
scenario analysis issued by Morgan Stanley after the firm files 10-K 
report for year t. 
HighSpecificity An indicator variable that equals one if Specificity for firm i is in the 
top quintile among all sample firms in 2010, zero if Specificity is in 
the bottom quintile. 
BtM The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. 
ReturnVolatility The standard deviation of daily stock returns in year t-1. 
EarningsVolatility The standard deviation of quarterly earnings in the past 20 quarters 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean of quarterly earnings in the 
past 20 quarters. 
NegEarnings An indicator variable that equals one if the sum of the past four 
quarterly earnings is negative, and zero otherwise. 
∆Earnings The difference between net income in year t and net income in year t-
1. 
Accrual The absolute value of accruals calculated using the cash flows 
statement deflated by average total assets. 
PastLoss An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has one or more loss 
years over the previous five years, zero otherwise. 
Litigation An indicator variable that equals one for firms in SIC 
codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370- 
7374, and 8731-8734, zero otherwise. 
|CAREA-1,1| The same calculation as |CAR10k-1,1| with event date as the annual 
earnings announcement date. 
FileDate An indicator variable that equals one when the 10-K filing date is at 
least 90 days after the year end, zero otherwise. 
NumItems The number of non-missing items on COMPUSTAT in a fiscal year. 
Size The natural logarithm of the market value of equity. 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
Segments The natural logarithm of one plus the number of segments. 
HighInstitution An indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s institutional 
ownership is above the median institutional ownership of all firms in 
the same year.  
ProprietaryCost R&D intensity, calculated as the R&D expense divided by total asset 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. Missing data is replaced by zero. 
Num8K The number of 8-K files in the one-year period before the 10-K 
filings. 
ForecastError The difference of the mean EPS forecast with the announced EPS 
standardized by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
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Missing data is replace by zero. 
ForecastMissing An indicator that equals one if Forecast Error is missing and zero 
otherwise.  
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Table 1: Sample composition by year and industry 
Panel A: By year 
Year 
Specificity Item 1A # 
Words 
Observations 
2006 5.57% 4,193 2,642 
2007 5.55% 4,495 2,478 
2008 5.43% 4,829 2,733 
2009 5.52% 5,447 2,520 
2010 5.35% 5,732 2,371 
2011 5.22% 6,051 2,121 
Total 
  14,865 
 
Panel B: By industry 
Industry Specificity (%) Item1A Observations % 
Utilities 7.16 4,558 397 2.67 
Mining and minerals 6.4 5,956 123 0.83 
Transportation 6.15 4,212 575 3.87 
Banks, Insurance 
Companies, and Other 
Financials 
6.05 5,027 3,186 21.43 
Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, 
and Tobacco 
5.99 7,598 609 4.1 
Chemicals 5.79 4,395 272 1.83 
Fabricated Products 5.62 4,267 108 0.73 
Steel Works 5.56 3,807 156 1.05 
Automobiles 5.54 3,126 193 1.3 
Other 5.41 5,649 4,559 30.67 
Food 5.28 3,184 371 2.5 
Oil and Petroleum 
Products 
5.1 5,167 563 3.79 
Consumer Durables 4.85 3,773 303 2.04 
Textiles, Apparel, and 
Footwear 
4.82 4,079 230 1.55 
4.67 5,306 1,928 12.97 
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Machinery and Business 
Equipment 
Construction and 
Construction Materials 
4.61 3,743 411 2.77 
Retail Stores 4.32 3,871 881 5.93 
This table provides data on sample composition for the market-reaction tests. The analyst-related tests rely 
on a smaller sample, as explained in the text. Item 1A is the length (number of words) of that section. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Market reaction sample (N = 14,865) 
 mean std p10 p25 median p75 p90 
|CAR10k-1,1| 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 
Specificity 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 
Specificity10K 0.19 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23 
Amount 4.00 0.80 3.05 3.58 4.06 4.53 4.91 
|CAREA-1,1| 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.15 
FileDate 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NumItems 159.20 22.60 127.00 142.00 161.00 176.00 187.00 
Size 6.38 1.92 3.88 5.05 6.36 7.67 8.86 
Fog 19.94 1.75 18.33 18.98 19.79 20.71 21.84 
TotalLength 10.29 0.79 9.62 10.01 10.34 10.70 11.06 
∆Earnings 0.25 15.35 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.12 
Accrual 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.17 
BtM 0.65 2.84 0.16 0.31 0.53 0.83 1.29 
PastLoss 0.54 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Leverage 0.57 0.52 0.20 0.35 0.55 0.76 0.91 
ReturnVolatility 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Litigation 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Segments 0.81 0.41 0.00 0.69 0.69 1.10 1.39 
Num8K 2.77 0.50 2.20 2.48 2.77 3.09 3.37 
ProprietaryCost 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.13 
ForecastError 0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
ForecastMissing 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
RiskWords 4.07 0.64 3.30 3.64 4.01 4.45 4.94 
 
Panel B: Analyst sample (N = 627) 
  mean std p10 p25 median p75 p90 
|Unanticipated-
return| 0.20 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.40 
Spread 0.63 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.56 0.75 1.00 
HighSpecificity 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Specificity 10K 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.23 
BtM 0.51 0.40 0.15 0.25 0.41 0.68 0.98 
Leverage 0.58 0.21 0.29 0.44 0.60 0.72 0.89 
NegEarnings 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EarningsVolatility  2.71 8.53 0.24 0.33 0.54 1.38 5.13 
Size 8.96 1.46 7.16 7.93 8.94 9.94 11.01 
ReturnVolatility 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Amount 4.08 0.77 3.04 3.66 4.16 4.60 4.97 
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Fog 19.97 2.12 18.33 19.02 19.83 20.85 22.13 
TotalLength 10.62 0.90 9.95 10.32 10.68 11.08 11.41 
∆Earnings 0.01 0.19 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.07 
Accrual 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 
PastLoss 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Litigation 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Segments 0.96 0.44 0.69 0.69 0.69 1.39 1.61 
RiskWords 4.47 0.72 3.61 3.99 4.38 4.96 5.37 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. The summary statistics presented are before winsorization.  
 
Panel C: Specificity by section and Pearson correlations  
 Mean     Std 
Specificity 0.05 0.03 
Specificity 10K 0.19 0.04 
Specificity MD&A 0.23 0.08 
   
 
Specificity 
10K 
Specificity 
MD&A 
Specificity 0.11** 0.08** 
Specificity 10K  0.11** 
Note: For the pairwise comparison, ** indicates significance at the 5% level (two-sided).  
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Table 3: Determinants of specificity 
 Specificity (×100) 
Specificity 10K 7.253*** 
 (4.017) 
Amount 0.189*** 
 (2.592) 
RiskWords -0.0132 
 (-0.113) 
Fog -0.0290 
 (-1.201) 
TotalLength 0.472** 
 (2.248) 
Proprietary Cost -1.201*** 
 (-2.658) 
∆Earnings 0.0634 
 (0.983) 
Accrual -0.697* 
 (-1.754) 
Size -0.0902*** 
 (-2.736) 
BtM 0.102 
 (1.439) 
PastLoss 0.114 
 (1.264) 
Leverage 0.922*** 
 (4.474) 
ReturnVolatility 11.80*** 
 (4.934) 
Litigation 0.124 
 (1.123) 
Segments -0.245* 
 (-1.747) 
Num8K 0.0915 
 (0.922) 
ForecastError 0.312** 
 (2.054) 
ForecastMissing 0.464*** 
 (4.078) 
Constant -1.039 
 (-0.526) 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 14,865 
Adjusted R2 0.098 
The table reports coefficient estimates from a regression of Specificity on determinants for the full sample. 
Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and filing month. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * 
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indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 4: Specificity and stock-market reactions 
 
 |CAR10-K-1,1| ABVOL10-K-1,1 
   
Specificity 0.0267** 0.710* 
 (2.358) (1.954) 
Specificity 10K 0.0200*** 0.00828 
 (2.613) (0.0550) 
Amount 0.000998 0.0272** 
 (1.316) (2.454) 
RiskWords -0.000127 0.00745 
 (-0.187) (0.352) 
Fog 0.000187 0.00353 
 (0.794) (0.895) 
TotalLength 0.00255*** 0.0296 
 (4.142) (1.384) 
ProprietaryCost 0.00111 -0.733*** 
 (0.250) (-5.181) 
∆Earnings -0.00190* 0.101*** 
 (-1.820) (2.846) 
Accrual 0.000992 0.297** 
 (0.0990) (2.100) 
Size -0.00305*** -0.0511*** 
 (-4.293) (-2.646) 
BtM 0.000171 -0.0734*** 
 (0.194) (-4.234) 
PastLoss 0.00250*** -0.00830 
 (4.811) (-0.286) 
Leverage 0.00716** 0.0721 
 (2.539) (1.321) 
ReturnVolatility 0.486*** -4.692*** 
 (4.611) (-5.259) 
Litigation 0.00265*** 0.00586 
 (3.143) (0.225) 
Segments 0.00534*** 0.0907*** 
 (3.349) (3.829) 
Num8K 0.00124* -0.0317* 
 (1.892) (-1.848) 
ForecastError 0.0105*** 0.0328 
 (5.405) (0.504) 
ForecastMissing -7.37e-05 0.0934** 
 (-0.0322) (2.262) 
FileDate 0.00576 0.149** 
 (1.613) (2.037) 
NumItems -4.64e-05** -4.87e-05 
 (-2.475) (-0.0590) 
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|CAREA-1,1| 0.270*** 3.792*** 
 (9.483) (5.579) 
Constant -0.0168** 0.142 
 (-2.089) (0.516) 
Industry FE 
 
Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
   
N 14,865 14,865 
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.067 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. The first column reports coefficient estimates from a regression of 
|CAR10-K-1,1| on Specificity and other controls. The second column reports coefficient estimates from a 
regression of ABVOL10-K-1,1 on Specificity and other controls. Panel A uses levels analyses, and Panel B 
uses changes analyses. Litigation is suppressed in the changes analyses, as it is based on industry and not 
changing by year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent. Standard errors are 
two-way clustered by firm and filing month. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed).  
50 
 
Table 5: Pseudo analysis for Specificity and market reactions 
 
 |CAR10-K-1,1| ABVOL10-K-1,1 
   
Specificity 0.0115 -0.00338 
 (0.569) (-0.566) 
Specificity 10K 0.0290 0.00370 
 (1.471) (1.366) 
Amount -0.00110 -2.73e-05 
 (-1.108) (-0.293) 
RiskWords 0.000846*** 0.000317 
 (2.655) (1.531) 
Fog -0.000634*** 2.19e-05 
 (-3.130) (0.397) 
TotalLength 0.000485 -0.000182 
 (0.413) (-1.369) 
ProprietaryCost -0.00697 0.000707 
 (-0.624) (0.342) 
∆Earnings 0.000412 0.000712*** 
 (0.237) (3.993) 
Accrual 0.0112*** 0.00324 
 (3.189) (1.457) 
Size -0.00103*** -0.000121** 
 (-7.572) (-2.050) 
BtM -0.00160 0.000177 
 (-0.924) (1.219) 
PastLoss 0.00256 -0.000140 
 (1.135) (-0.400) 
Leverage -0.00381*** 0.000685 
 (-9.214) (1.568) 
ReturnVolatility 0.596*** -0.00647 
 (12.97) (-0.895) 
Litigation 0.00471*** 0.000766** 
 (2.727) (2.526) 
Segments -0.000821 -1.21e-05 
 (-0.675) (-0.0335) 
Num8K 0.000957 0.000344** 
 (1.304) (2.216) 
ForecastError 0.0196 -0.00203*** 
 (1.269) (-4.090) 
ForecastMissing 0.00169** -0.000345 
 (2.429) (-1.095) 
Constant 0.0298*** 0.00295*** 
 (4.097) (3.593) 
FileDate 0.00328*** 0.000719*** 
 (3.071) (4.633) 
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NumItems -4.15e-05 -1.46e-05*** 
 (-1.540) (-5.001) 
|CAREA-1,1| 0.111*** 0.000138 
 (8.791) (0.0490) 
Industry FE 
 
Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
   
N 4,158 4,156 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.011 
 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. The table reports pseudo test results. Specificity and Amount are 
calculated for the sample firms using data at fiscal year 2006. For each firm’s each Specificity and Amount 
observation, we calculate dependent variable |CAR10-K-1,1| and all independent variables other than 
Specificity and Amount using the data for the same firm but in the fiscal years from 2001 to 2004. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent. Standard errors are two-way clustered 
by firm and filing month. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 6: Cross-sectional tests based on proprietary costs 
 |CAR10-K-1,1| ABVOL10-K-1,1 
 High  
Proprietary Cost 
Low  
Proprietary Cost 
High  
Proprietary Cost 
Low  
Proprietary Cost 
     
Specificity -0.00484 0.0375* -0.0310 1.091** 
 (-0.214) (1.924) (-0.0514) (2.230) 
Specificity 10K 0.0283 0.00961 -0.219 0.106 
 (1.449) (0.798) (-0.643) (0.540) 
Amount -0.000638 0.00216** 0.0177 0.0387** 
 (-0.875) (2.315) (0.742) (2.156) 
RiskWords -0.000957 0.000957 -0.0323 0.0399 
 (-0.975) (1.040) (-0.640) (1.465) 
Fog 0.000170 0.000177 -0.0102 0.0104** 
 (0.531) (0.672) (-1.202) (2.108) 
TotalLength 0.00293*** 0.00216*** 0.0214 0.0337 
 (3.653) (2.760) (0.803) (0.909) 
∆Earnings -0.00168 -0.00168 0.124 0.0831 
 (-0.450) (-1.246) (1.127) (1.217) 
Accrual -0.00153 0.00473 0.263* 0.160 
 (-0.167) (0.447) (1.925) (0.538) 
Size -0.00367*** -0.00278*** -0.0563** -0.0488*** 
 (-5.504) (-3.094) (-2.553) (-2.634) 
BtM 0.000973 -0.000505 0.000864 -0.108*** 
 (0.677) (-0.493) (0.0203) (-7.014) 
PastLoss 0.00226 0.00265*** -0.0112 -0.00485 
 (1.509) (3.676) (-0.356) (-0.136) 
Leverage 0.00968*** 0.00460 0.125 -0.0275 
 (4.478) (1.326) (1.462) (-0.466) 
ReturnVolatility 0.445*** 0.489*** -8.087*** -2.429*** 
 (4.831) (4.023) (-4.161) (-3.004) 
Litigation 0.00264*** 0.00267 -0.0214 -0.0117 
 (2.703) (1.085) (-0.805) (-0.220) 
Segments 0.00543*** 0.00376* 0.118*** 0.0680** 
 (2.843) (1.860) (3.752) (2.384) 
Num8K 0.00301** 0.000218 -0.0206 -0.0404** 
 (2.149) (0.408) (-0.738) (-2.003) 
ForecastError 0.0137*** 0.00783** 0.0748 -0.0190 
 (3.645) (2.360) (0.900) (-0.216) 
ForecastMissing -0.00222 0.00141 0.0649 0.116 
 (-0.589) (0.696) (0.726) (1.563) 
FileDate 0.00553 0.00543 0.165 0.137 
 (1.532) (0.789) (1.488) (1.196) 
NumItems -0.000115*** 2.13e-05 0.000133 0.00103 
 (-2.940) (0.671) (0.0831) (1.358) 
|CAREA-1,1| 0.247*** 0.291*** 3.533*** 4.072*** 
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 (8.663) (10.05) (5.714) (5.199) 
Constant -0.000632 -0.0276* 0.609*** -0.331 
 (-0.120) (-1.894) (3.130) (-0.870) 
Industry FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 6,045 8,820 6,045 8,820 
Adjusted R2 0.289 0.345 0.063 0.071 
 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. The first two columns report coefficient estimates from a regression 
of |CAR10-K-1,1| on Specificity and other controls. Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates from a 
regression of ABVOL10-K-1,1 on Specificity and other controls. We partition based on whether the sample 
firms have non-zero R&D or not. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent. 
Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and filing month. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 7: Specificity and analysts’ risk assessment 
  
 
 
|Unanticipated- 
return| 
|Unanticipated- 
return| 
   
Spread 0.110* 0.0522 
 (1.954) (0.691) 
Spread×HighSpecificity  0.112** 
  (2.062) 
HighSpecificity -0.0733 -0.0463 
 (-1.237) (-1.386) 
Leverage -0.0709 -0.112*  
(-1.145) (-1.655) 
BtM 0.0419 0.0264  
(0.770) (0.443) 
Size 0.00962 0.00267  
(1.104) (0.257) 
EarningsVolatility 0.000711 0.000950  
(0.439) (0.603) 
NegEarnings 0.0421 0.0166 
 (1.403) (0.567) 
ReturnVolatility 3.074*** 3.443*** 
 (2.587) (2.752) 
Specificity 10-K  -0.0171 
  (-0.376) 
Amount  -0.00184  
 (-0.422) 
RiskWords  0.0429*** 
  (2.893) 
Fog  0.0120***  
 (4.195) 
TotalLength  -0.0198***  
 (-2.852) 
∆Earnings  -0.103  
 (-1.199) 
Accrual  0.0113  
 (0.0808) 
PastLoss  0.00225  
 (0.10) 
Litigation  -0.0479***  
 (-3.041) 
Segments  0.000800  
 (0.0462) 
Constant -0.0543 -0.119 
 (-0.571) (-0.776) 
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Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 627 627 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.135 
 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 
percent. The first column reports coefficient estimates from a regression of |Unanticipated-return| on 
Spread and other controls for the analyst risk assessment sample (i.e., we replicate Joos et al. (2015) and 
find consistent results). The second column adds interaction term Spread×Specificity. Note that the second 
column presents results after controlling for all the determinants of Specificity from Table 4 (untabulated). 
Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year. t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Specificity and analysts’ forecasted spread 
  
 Spread 
  
HighSpecificity -0.0338* 
 (-1.912) 
Specificity 10-K 0.432 
 (1.464) 
Amount -0.0115 
 (-0.764) 
RiskWords 0.0269 
 (0.953) 
Fog -0.00279 
 (-0.449) 
TotalLength 0.000794 
 (0.0656) 
∆Earnings -0.0905* 
 (-1.873) 
Accrual 0.0252** 
 (2.145) 
PastLoss 0.00292 
 (0.0651) 
Litigation -0.00164 
 (-0.0402) 
Segments -0.0413 
 (-1.147) 
Leverage 0.0194 
 (0.214) 
BtM 0.0836 
 (1.559) 
Size -0.0171*** 
 (-2.734) 
EarningsVolatility -0.000442 
 (-0.417) 
NegEarnings 0.0480 
 (0.640) 
ReturnVolatility 9.529*** 
 (5.428) 
Constant 0.360* 
 (1.943) 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
  
Observations 627 
Adjusted R2 0.334 
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See Appendix C for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 
percent. The table reports coefficient estimates from a regression of Spread on HighSpecificity and other 
controls for the analysts’ risk assessment sample. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and year. 
t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
(two-tailed). 
